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[C] needs one more interpretation in order to dissolve the contradiction with the first old doctrine [A], 
the other old doctrine [B] shows nothing as to the relationship between Matter, Name, and Speech 
except that Matter and Name can indirectly generate their common result, Speech; namely, as to the 
relationship between Matter and Name, the two have no relationship.  Hence, there is no dissolving the 
contradiction between the unrelated two.  Fortunately, the latter doctrine [B] presents this relationship 
from the viewpoint of those who listen to a speech, which shows that Speech can affect Name, and 
thereby Name can manifest Matter.  
Therefore, the discussion about “the basis of Speech” is primarily about the relationship between 
cause and effect from the viewpoint of those who make Speech; however, in order to dissolve 
contradiction, the relationship between what is based and what is the base (affecting and affected, or 
manifesting and manifested) from the viewpoint of those who listen to Speech is applicable to the 
discussion about “the basis of Speech,” and eventually the interpretation and explanation from the 
viewpoint of the listeners of the teachings came to be the mainstream.  
 
Dharmottara's Theory of Cognition of the Object:  
Between the Conceptual and the Non-conceptual 
MIYO Mai 
The Buddhist logico-epistemological school accepts two kinds of valid cognition (pramāa), 
direct perception (pratyaka) and inference (anumāna), and direct perception as cognition free from 
conceptual construction. Therefore, direct perception is supposed to operate as valid cognition without 
any conceptual construction. However, Dharmottara, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's opuses, 
defines valid cognition as the cognition that causes a person to make an act, and he is of the opinion that 
making an act presupposes judgment of some kind or another. Then, the question is how direct 
perception without conceptual cognition could be considered as valid cognition, if the judgment is 
conceptualistic. 
In this article, I would like to examine how Dhamottara resolved this question referring to his 
Nyāyabinduīkā, Laghuprāmāyaparīkā and Pramāaviniścayaīkā, with previous studies by Dr. Oki 
Kazufumi and Dr. Helmut Krasser. I focus especially on cognition of the object (arthādhigati), which is 
presented as the result of valid cognition (pramāaphala) in the case of direct perception, and deal with 
the problems of the relation between cognition of the object and the judgment and whether the cognition 
of the object is conceptual or non-conceptual. 
At first, I confirm Dharmottara's definition of valid cognition and its result. According to him, 
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pramāa as valid cognition (samyagjñāna) is cognition causing a person to make an act (pravartaka) on 
the object, namely cognition causing a person to attain (prāpaka) the object, which is equated with 
cognition showing the object of the act and with cognition discriminating the object. On the other hand, 
a result of valid cognition is the function (vyāpāra) of such cognition for causing a person to attain the 
object, which is equated with the fact of showing the object of the act (prav ttiviayapradarśana) and 
with cognition of the object (arthādhigati). 
Secondly, I inquire into the object of the act and the discrimination in view of two kinds of 
objects of direct perception, that is, the object that is directly grasped (grāhya), existing momentarily, 
and the object of judgment (adhyavaseya), having a temporal span. This view is typical of Dharmottara. 
The result shows that the object of both act and discrimination is the object of judgment, which is 
closely related with an achievement of a purpose (arthakriyā). 
Finally, I attempt to demonstrate the position of cognition of the object in the process of direct 
perception, applying the same kind of relation as these two object to that between cognition of the 
object and judgment. In the process of direct perception, non-conceptual direct perception having the 
form of the object matter (ex. the blue) arises at first, and then conceptual cognition arises, which 
judges the precedent direct perception. The fact that the precedent direct perception is of a certain 
object (ex. the blue) is ascertained only if the later conceptual cognition judges it. Therefore, The 
cognition of the object itself exists as non-conceptual, but it is all but conceptual because it is cognition 
of a certain object is ascertained by conceptual cognition. 
 
What is abhāvapramā in the demonstration of svaprakāśa in the 
Advaitavedānta school?: In contrast to viparyaya 
MANABE Tomohiro  
I previously contributed an article about the demonstration of vijñāna svaprakāśatā seen in the 
Khaanakhaakhādya (Kh), which was written to Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) of the Advaitavedānta school. In 
that case, evidence is found in the Kh for the conception of the right cognition of negation 
(vyatirekapramā), which is hardly found in other texts of the Advaitavedānta school, so I contributed 
the article about this conception. In that article, it becomes clear that this conception is the right 
cognition of nonexistence of cognition (abhāvapramā) and possesses the problem of whether it is 
svaprakāśa or not. But I could not examine the similarities and differences between abhāvapramā with 
an error (viparyaya) and abhāvapramā, so I consider the difference between abhāvapramā and 
viparyaya in this article. 
